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In his article "Indeterminacy. Empiricism, and the First Person",l 
John Searle attempts to show that W.V. Quine's indeterminacy thesis 
provides a reductio ad absurdum of linguistic behaviorism. Linguistic 
behaviorism understands linguistic acts in terms of stimulus situations 
which create dispositions to verbal behavior. The indeterminacy thesis, a 
result of this linguistic behaviorism, states that there is no fact of the m alter 
which determines the correct translation of any term of a language into 
another language. That is, there will be a number of coherent yet mutually 
incompatible translations of any language into another. Searle, believing 
that there is determinate meaning, maintains that Quine's argument. and 
therefore linguistic behaviorism, must be flawed. In order to make this 
point, Searle invokes the first person point of view. Such introspective 
evidence. he claims, demonstrates the obvious absurdity ofthe thesis and the 
resulting concept of inscrutable reference. 
I will attempt to show that linguistic behaviorism can easily account 
for this introspective data without abandoning indeterminacy. I also hope 
to make evident the reasons why Searle's objection, as well as ones similar 
to it, are at first glance so intuitively compelling. Before considering 
Searle's position, however, let us briefly outline the indeterminacy thesis 
and its logical results. 
II 
In order to isolate and examinc meaning, Quine begins by describ­
ing a situation ofradical translation. In such a situation, though the linguistic 
utterances of one language differ greatly from those of the other, meaning 
is somehow preserved in translation. Examining the evidence by which a 
linguist arrives at a viable translation, then, will lead to an objective, 
lSearle, "Indetenninacy, Empiricism, and the First Person" (The 
Journal of Philosophy, March, 1987). 
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empirical rendering of meaning. Since "All the objective data he [the 
linguist] has to go on are the forces that he sees impinging on the native's 
surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal and otherwise, of the native,"2 
Quine does not posit some intentional definition of linguistic meaning. 
Instead, he takes a behavioristic point of view by concerning himself with 
"language as the complex ofpresent dispositions to verbal behavior". 3 The 
actual internal processes by which such dispositions come about after a 
given stimuli are irrelevant for two reasons. First. they are unobserv able and 
therefore cannot be part ofan empirical project. Second, they will vary from 
person to person within a linguistic community, yet a uniformity ofcommu­
nication will reSUlt, indicating their future irrelevance to the project. 4 Thus, 
meaning in the intuitive sense is redefined as stimulus meaning: the class 
of all non-verbal stimulus situations in which a speaker would assent to a 
query about a term contrasted with those situations in which the speaker 
would dissent. 
The example of radical translation that Quine uses is that of the 
imagined native term 'gavagai.' A linguist in a foreign land has just 
witnessed a rabbit scampering across the trail, and the native she was with 
has shouted "Gavagai!" while pointing towards the rabbit. Thus, the linguist 
may hypothesize that the one word sentence 'Gavagai!' translates into the 
English sentence "A rabbiU" (or, simply, "Rabbit!"). Then thelinguistmay 
question the native while presenLinghim with various stimulus situations, in 
order to zero in on the stimulus meaning. If the stimulus meaning of 
'gavagai' is the same as the stimulus meaning of 'rabbit', then she may 
translate 'gavagai' as 'rabbit' in English. 
Indeterminacy comes in when it is realized that there may be more 
than one translation of the native's sentence into English which fits with the 
totality of stimulus situations. Two examples which Quine uses are 
'undetached rabbit part' and 'stage in the life ofa rabbit'. If' rabbit' hac;; the 
2Quine, Word and Object. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1960), p.28. 
3Ibid.• p.27. 
40n page 8 of W & 0 Quine illustrates this point masterfully: "Differ­
ent persons growing up in the same language are like different bushes trimmed 
and trained to take the shape of identical elephants. The anatomical details of 
twigs and branches will fulfill the elephantine form differently from bush to 
bush, but the overall outward results are alike." 
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same stimulus meaning as • gavagai', then so would these other two 
translations, because they have the same stimulus meaning as 'rabbit'. 
Stimulus meaning being the only evidence admissible, there is no way to 
determine which translation is the correct one. Thus, the linguist (or a 
number oflinguist working separately) could arrive at a number of transla­
tions, all of which facilitate communication, but which are not compatible 
with one another. 
To illustrate this point imagine two linguists, each independently 
working opposite sides of a village, yet unaware of each other. After each 
has painstakingly formulated a manual of translation they chance to meet. 
One night about the campfire the two enterinto a conversation with the same 
native. After each of the native's utterances the two riffle through their 
respective manuals, arrive at English translations (separately), formulate 
(separate) responses in English, translate the responses back into the 
native's language, and finally each responds to the native. The three have 
an intelligent and entertaining (albeit arduous) conversation. Thus we see 
that both translations are coherent. Ifthe two should decide to compare notes 
afterwards, however, they will be surprised to find that while the one linguist 
believed they were having a conversation about the native's religious 
beliefs, the other believed they were having a conversation about particle 
physics. Even greater confusion would have ensued if the linguists had 
compared notes during the conversation orhad jointly attempted to translate 
the native's utterances. 
While this example may seem slightly exaggerated in order to 
demonstrate the mutual incompatibility ofthe two translation schemes, such 
an incompatibility will nonetheless exist. It must be stressed that I am 
working with what might be called a "strong" conception ofindeterminacy. 
That is, I do not view indeterminacy as simply the possibility of a certain 
amountof"play" in translation. I expect that Searle would not object to that 
view. Instead, I understand indeterminacy as expressing the possibility of 
a number of different configurations of utterance/stimulus-situation corre­
spondences, while still accounting for all dispositions to verbal behavior 
(Le., preserving effective communication). Further, there is no fact (know­
able or otherwise) that will determine a "correct" cOnfiguration.5 
5There is, of course, a debate over the "extenl" or "range" of indetermi­
nacy. For further work in this area see Jonathan Bennett,Linguistic Behavior; 
or Mark Lance, "From a Normative Point of View." 
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A second result ofthe behavioristic stance which Quine takes is the 
inscrutability of reference. Because there is no fact of the matter about 
whether the native's term 'gavagai' is correctly translatable as 'rabbit', 
'rabbit stage' , or 'undetached rabbit part', there can be no fact of the matter 
about what, exactly, he is referring to. The only objective fact is the totality 
of stimulus situations in which he would assent to our linguist's query, 
"Gavagai?" But as the totality ofstimulus situations for the three proffered 
translations are virtually identical (says Quine) there is no way of distin­
guishing which of the three the linguist shOuld choose for translation and in 
tum the object ofreference. Thus reference becomes inscrutable. This point 
will receive more attention as we begin to consider Searle's objections. 
III 
The logical consequences ofindeterminacy pertain not only to cases 
ofradical translation, but also to cases in which two people communicate in 
a common native language. Further, and most important to the bulk of 
Searle's argument, indeterminacy and inscrutability pertain to the specific 
case of my own speech as understood by myself. This is the point at which, 
Searle claims, the absurdity is most evident. Searle maintains that if the 
thesis shows that there is no difference (as to meaning or reference) to me 
between the terms 'rabbit', 'rabbit stage' ,and 'undetached rabbit part' when 
I use them myself, then it is obviously a false thesis. This is because, through 
introspection, the difference is evident to me, or so claims Searle. 
Though he never gives a definite description of what, exactly. the 
difference is or how it may be discerned (I assume he would appeal to some 
as of yet undetermined intemalistic notion). he does give two interesting 
examples ofhow the supposed absurdity manifests itself. These examples, 
however, fail to refute Quine's thesis or linguistic behaviorism in general. 
In fact, I would endeavor to show that in seeing these examples as creating 
absurdities, Searle misses the point of the indeterminacy thesis-the objec­
tions he raises from the first person point of view being possible only given 
the results of the thesis itself. While introspective evidence leads Searle to 
believe in determinate meaning, all he is really introspecting is his disposi­
tion to deal with indeterminacy in the most practical way; that is, taking the 
mother tongue at face value. Further, developing a contextual defmition of 
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'meaning' will enable us to work our way about the issue without being 
caught in the same snare as Searle. 
Searle's first example of absurdity will eventually lead us to his 
second example, and examination of the two will hopefully bring an 
understanding of the issue. He writes: 
If the indetenninacy thesis were really true, we 
would not even be able to understand its formulation; for 
when we were told there was no "fact ofthe matter" about 
the correctness ofthe trans lation betwee n rabbit and rabbit 
stage, we would not have been able to hear any (objectively 
real) difference between the two English expressions to 
start with. (his italics)6 
This objection ofSearle's is, intuitively, a very compelling one; an 
objection which I initially held, as a matter of fact. There is, however, a 
problem here. The objection simply says that in order to understand the 
indeterminacy thesis, we must be able to do what it says we cannot do. Thus, 
since we understand the argument it must be false. When first presented wi th 
this objection it seems so simple and obvious that one cannot help but wanl 
to accepl it. The response to this objection, however, is that in making some 
sort of distinction between 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage' we are not (as Searle 
believes) violating the terms of the thesis. 
Searle seems to believe that the distinction we must make in order 
for the argument to work is one which supersedes the behaviorist view of 
meaning. thereby necessitating another (intemalist) view of meaning and 
vitiating Quine's argument. However, this is not what we need to do in order 
to grasp the thesis. Working from the behaviorist's view and thereby 
through the terms ofthe thesis, we admit the stimulus synonymy ofthe three 
terms 'rabbit', 'rabbit stage' ,and 'undetached rabbit part' . Then we note the 
following: the choice of which these terms to use in our translation scheme 
will affect and be affected by other judgements we must make in construct­
ing that scheme (e.g., analytical hypotheses relating to such things as 
identity, difference, pluralizations, etc.) with the result that we ultimately 
arrive at three coherent, yet mutually incompatible translation schemes. 
p.131. 
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Although we acknowledge that the use ofone term over another will. 
create a difference in our translation scheme, we do not thereby acknowl­
edge any fixed meaning or reference for these tenns. We merely acknowl­
edge that the terms differ relative to a background language and translation 
scheme. That is, relative to one scheme 'gavagai' will translate into the 
(background) English language as 'rabbit' and, e.g., • gavagug' will trans­
late as 'rabbit stage'. However, relative to another translation scheme 
'gavagai' will translateinto a (different background) English as 'undetached 
rabbit part' and 'gavagug' will translate as 'rabbit'. Further, the supposed 
"fixed" difference we perceive when arbitrarily and uncritically utilizing the 
background language is itself subject to indetenninacy when translating 
from, e.g., English into English. The reference of the tenn 'rabbit' will be 
rabbit stage relative to one translation scheme/background language, 
undetached rabbit part relative to another, and rabbit relative to a third. Even 
ifwe try to clarifyorfix ourmeaning, these attempts at clarification will also 
be subject to relativity to the background language in which we are working. 
Meaning and reference, then, are relative to the scheme of transla­
tion which we choose. This scheme of translation is, in turn, relative to some 
background language into which we are translating. Thus, it would seem 
thatin the case oftranslating from my native language into itse!fwe are faced 
with an infinite regress of sorts. That is, the reference of any term in a given 
English is relative to the background of a second English, and the reference 
ofany term in that second English is relative to a third and so on. We must, 
then, accept an arbitrary point of which we can anchor meaning and 
reference. Searle, however, sees this solution as ineffective, claiming that 
it only reiterates the absurdity of relativity and indeterminacy: 
We cannot, on the one hand, insist on a rigorous 
behaviorism that implies that there is no fact of the matter 
and then, when we get into trouble, appeal to a naive notion 
of a mother tongue or home language with words having a 
face value in excess of their empirical behavioral content. 
Ifwc are serious about our behaviorism, the mother tongue 
is the mother of indeterminacy, and the face value is 
counterfeitifit suggests that there are empirical differences 
when in fact there are none.? 
p.133. 
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Thisquotationmustbeexamined carefully, because itdemonstrates 
a problem which runs throughout Searle's argument. Ifhe wishes to take the 
indeterminacy thesis on it's own terms (Le.: linguistic behaviorism) which 
he must do in order to show that it creates a reductio of itself, then he must 
let go ofhis belief (if only long enough to derive the reductio) that there is 
determinate meaning. One cannot help but recognize in reading his article, 
however. that he does not do this. In fact, it is this adherence to some (never­
stated) theory of determinate meaning which creates the apparent absurdi­
ties Searle sights in order to refute Quine's thesis. Searle criticizes the 
appeal to a background language with "words having a face value in excess 
of their empirical behavioral content." Yet no claim is made by the 
behaviorist that the arbitrary background language has any such"excessive" 
values. This is Searle's assumption. Next, he states that if we are to accept 
linguistic behaviorism, "the face value is counterfeit ifit suggests that there 
are empirical differences when in fact there are none." His use of the word 
"counterfeit" presupposes that there is some genuine article somewhere. 
Might not Searle, or anyone who objects to the indeterminacy thesis in a 
similar manner, be confusing internalisticnotions offixedlanguagewith the 
uncritical, unconscious acceptance ofthe language he learned as a child? Let 
us develop the concept of accepting an arbitrary background language 
before attempting an answer to this question. 
IV 
The purpose oflanguage is, vaguely, to communicate. That is, to 
interact with our environment and each other effectively. Language is the 
necessary tool which allows two or more people to do such things as build 
a hut in which to live. protect their territory from invading forces. get the 
harvest in as efficiently as possible. accurately predict natural phenomena. 
and influence or subjugate others. With language we are able to consult one 
another ("What amount of water with this much mud makes the best 
brick?"); leave behind or pass on information ("I was told this amount of 
waterworks best."); organize a collective effort ("You two go to the right, 
he and I will go to the left."); and so on. We need (and have) a language 
system which works to accomplish these goals, as well as many others. 
Thus, when I am in a situation in which my fellow hunter tells me to go spear 
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a couple ofrabbits for the upcoming midsummer feast, I do not resJXlnd, "Do 
you mean spear a rabbit, spear an undetached rabbit part, or spear a stage in 
the life ofthe rabbit?" I simply throw my weapon in the right direction, and 
return from the hunt with food for the feast. 
Philosopbers, on the other band, baving the lUXUry of others who 
take care of such things as raising animals for slaughter, and keeping 
territory ever safe from military (as well as economic and ideological) 
invasion, have time to ponder the meaning of 'meaning'. The (sometimes 
dubious) reward for our efforts are debates such as the ones discussed here. 
Ultimately, such philosophical inquiry is an attempt to increase our under­
standing oflanguage use (and perhaps our thought processes as well). As 
we find the urge or need to perform more and more subtle tasks with 
language we find it is, at times, inadequate. Thus the enterprise of 
questioning meaning. It is not when things run smoothly that we need ask 
questions about meaning, but only when a breakdown occurs (e.g., when one 
of us does not understand the use of a term, when a certain term needs 
clarification, or when we encounter others whose terms are not the same as 
ours). In fact, it may be that we would not even have a concept ofmeaning 
at all ifall communicatory exchanges occurred trouble-free. Forwhy should 
the question "What do you mean?" ever arise if everyone were always 
understood? 
The point to keep in mind through all this is that when such 
breakdowns do occur and we do end up questioning meaning, the resolution 
does not corne when we find that some determinate chunk of meaning 
adheres to a certain utterance. Rather, the problem is resolved when 
adequate functioning resumes. That is, when we are able either to point to 
a stimulus situation or to map already understood terms on to the problem­
atical one in such a way that our utterances produce, if not desired effects, 
at least understandable ones.8 In the case of radical translation we must start 
by establishing a set of stimulus meaningful translations. As the process 
To some these considerations and some of !hose that follow seem to 
suggest a functionalist, or even a mechanistic view of communication. This 
characterization would, however, be incorrect. My aim here is simply to 
examine the use of sentences such as 'What does this mean?' in order to show 
that an answer is possible even given indeterminacy. Whether or not a function~ 
alist view of communication necessarily underlies this exercise is irrelevant to 
the question at hand. 
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progresses we explain some tems through the use of others, every term 
ultimately relating back through various routes to stimulus meanings. That 
there is more than one possible translation that will work does not reduce the 
effectiveness of anyone ofthem. Only ifwe attempt to mix translations will 
we experience problems, as did the two linguists mentioned above. A term 
which functions effectively relative to a certain background language and 
translation scheme will lose that effectiveness when indiscriminately trans­
planted to another background language and scheme. (We should even go 
so far as to say that it will take on a different effectiveness when so 
transplanted. ) 
When such a breakdown occurs in the use ofEnglish we again look 
to stimulus situations and remappings to resolve the crisis. We almost 
invariably translate every tem homophonic ally, except the problematic 
one. On to this we map other tems in order to make its use understood, 
effective. In other words, when we are asked, "What does 'X' mean?" or 
"What is the meaning of'X'?" what we are being asked is, "What other terms 
can be mapped onto 'X', substituted in this sentence for 'X'?" or "What 
other terms can be used to demonstrate proper usage of 'X'?" We arc not 
being asked, "What determinate thing, what chunk afmeaning corresponds 
to this term?" 
I-Jere, then, we employ a contextual definition of 'meaning'. That 
is, to understand what we mean by 'meaning' we substitute other words for 
it, finding that we look for what I have often described as rcmappings or 
substitutions of other words. Again, we are disposed to employ the easiest 
and swiftest remapping available (i.e.: the homophonic translation). We 
end up, in effect, taking our mother tongue at "face value." That we do this 
does not indicate that there is some genuine (as opposed to "counterfeit") 
chunk of meaning which we assign to a word. It merely indicates that to 
effect a complete heterophonic translation of English into English in order 
to clarify the use ofa term or two, while possible, is a tedious and impractical 
task. To do so when there has not even been a breakdown in communication 
is even more impractical. (perhaps the only practical reason for such a task 
would be to demonstrate the possibility to those who have not yet 
understood it.) 
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That I have substituted • effectiveness' and similar terms for 'mean­
ing' at different points throughout the preceding paragraphs has surely not 
gone unnoticed. While such vague usage must eventually be explicated, it 
emphasizes the use of a contextual definition of meaning, and serves to 
demonstrate a relatively simple point. Remember Searle's objection that 
face-value acceptance of the mother tongue was "counterfeit," and ex­
ceeded "empirical behavioral content." As meaning lies in the use of 
language there can be no genuine or counterfeit meaning; there can only be 
effective orineffective use. Further, whether we choose to anchor meaning 
and reference by simply accepting the face value ofour terms or by making 
aheterophonic translation every second Thursday, so long as use is effective 
and we can recognize it as such, no empirical behavioral content is exceeded. 
Our effective usage is empirical evidence enough to justify either approach. 
(The latter approach would most likely be considered a waste of time, 
however.) 
That it would be an incredibly tedious task to effect a complete 
heterophonic translation of English into English is a compelling reason not 
to do so. Searle's introspective evidence merely stresses this point. He 
introspects his disposition to translate homophonically and resolve crises of 
understanding in the most efficient manner, as described above. That he is 
not disposed to choose heterophonic translation, or does not realize that he 
could so choose, in no way denies the possibility. Nonetheless, it is easy to 
see how such introspection would lead one to believe in determinate 
meaning. When one then considers the implications of the indeterminacy 
thesis. it appears as if it threatens to unhinge meaning and communication 
altogether. We perceive an absurdity-an absurdity to which we often have 
a violent reaction. How can we communicate ifthere is no meaning? But 
if we find that we have misinterpreted our introspective data we realize that 
there is no absurdity. 
Thus, the absurdities Searle cites as creating a reductio argument 
against linguistic behaviorism and the indeterminacy thesis are no t absurdi­
ties at all. Using a contextual definition of 'meaning' has allowed us to speak 
of linguistic behavior without the fear of becoming lost in a morass of 
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meaninglessness due to indetenninacy. Such an undesirable fate seems 
immanent only if we take the view (as Searle does) that language is only 
effective given detenninate meaning. Further, as our approach salvages 
meaningfulness itsimultaneousl y allows us to appreci ate that there is no fact 
ofthe matter as to correcttranslation and that reference is ultimately relative. 
The first-person, introspective evidence Searle invokes (/know whatImean 
and what / am referring to) does not support the notion of detenninate 
internalistic meaning. This is notto say that Searle's assertion that he knows 
what he means is false. Of course he knows what he is saying. But Searle 
is wrong to confuse the effective use of language and the disposition to 
translate homophonically in order to facilitate such use with detenninate 
meaning. It is only in this confusion that the indetenninacy thesis appears 
absurd, for it is this very confusion, the myth of a thing called 'meaning', 
which indetenninacy seeks to unravel. The mother tongue is the mother of 
indetenninacy, but it is also the mother of another child: effective, 
meaningful language use. 
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